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AIDS: Does It Qualify as a "Handicap" Under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973?
In 1973, Congress implemented a broad governmental policy
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicap. The Rehabili-
tation Act of 19731 (Rehabilitation Act) mandates that certain
government contractors2 and all organizations receiving federal fi-
nancial assistance 3 refrain from discriminating against "qualified
handicapped individuals." 4 Since its enactment, many handicapped
1 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982)).
2 Section 503 of the Act states:
(a) Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department
or agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (in-
cluding construction) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring that,
in employing persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with the
United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment
qualified handicapped individuals as defined in section 706(7) of this title. The
provisions of this section shall apply to any subcontract in excess of $2,500 en-
tered into by a prime contractor in carrying out any contract for the procurement
of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the
United States. The President shall implement the provisions of this section by
promulgating regulations within ninety days after September 26, 1973.
29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1982).
For an excellent summary of this statute and others affecting employment of the handi-
capped, see Guy, The Developing Law on Equal Employment Opportunity for the Handicapped: An
Overview and Analysis of the Major Issues, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 183 (1978).
3 Section 504 of the Act states:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined
in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under
any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States
Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). This statute, unlike § 503 of the Act, imposes no affirmative action
requirement to hire handicapped individuals on those receiving federal financial assistance,
but simply demands nondiscrimination.
4 This note only addresses whether victims of AIDS can qualify as "handicapped indi-
viduals" under the Rehabilitation Act. Another potentially substantial hurdle awaits AIDS
victims who seek protection under the Act. An employee, having or suspected of having
AIDS, who seeks protection under § 504 must also show that he is "otherwise qualified" to
perform the job in question. According to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(HHS), an "otherwise qualified" handicapped person is an individual who, with "reason-
able accommodation," can perform the "essential functions" of the job. 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(k)(1) (1985). The United States Supreme Court has determined that an "otherwise
qualified" handicapped individual is "one who is able to meet all of a program's require-
ments in spite of his handicap." Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
406 (1979). One court summed up the plaintiffs predicament:
In defining who is a handicapped individual, § 504's "Catch 22" aspect appears:
the plaintiff must first show that he or she has some impairment which substan-
individuals have successfully used the Rehabilitation Act as an effec-
tive weapon to combat employment discrimination.
Eight years after Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act, the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported the first incidents of a
debilitating, communicable disorder, later named Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS).5 Since 1981, the number of AIDS
cases has increased dramatically, 6 as has the discrimination faced by
those afflicted with the disease.7 When employers discriminate
against AIDS victims, 8 the Rehabilitation Act provides one poten-
tial source of protection. If AIDS qualifies as a "handicap" for pur-
poses of the Act, employers who receive federal contracts or
tially limits a major life activity, but this same plaintiff must show that he or she is
not so handicapped as to be unable to perform the job.
Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 744 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
For purposes of § 503, a "qualified handicapped individual" is one who is "capable of
performing a particular job with reasonable accommodation to his or her handicap." 41
C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1985). Because of its affirmative action provision, § 503 does not re-
quire that a handicapped individual be capable of performing a job in spite of his handicap
for him to be classified as "qualified."
5 Although the CDC now recognizes that AIDS initially surfaced in 1979, the first pub-
lished reports were issued in 1981. See notes 10-11 infra.
6 See notes 14-15 infra and accompanying text.
7 Many incidents of AIDS-related employment discrimination have been reported in
recent years. One attorney, who is representing a graphic artist discharged following an
AIDS diagnosis, has predicted that "[t]here will be thousands of employees going to their
employers with this problem. AIDS is the ultimate health problem." Draftsman Files First
Washington-Area Case, AIDS POL'Y & L., Feb. 26, 1986, at 7.
In New Orleans, La., a former waiter has sued Hilton Hotels alleging he was dis-
charged after he told co-workers that his roommate had AIDS. The plaintiff is seeking
$57,000 in damages, including $5,000 for harassment suffered when, on his last day at
work, some co-workers wore white gloves "to avoid the plague." Id.
In Santa Barbara, Cal., Raytheon Co. placed a quality control analyst on involuntary
medical leave after it discovered that the employee had AIDS. The company refused to
allow the employee to return to work unless he could prove that AIDS was not casually
transglitted or that a cure for the disease existed. Raytheon believed it "behaved ration-
ally" based on its belief that the analyst's presence in the workplace demoralized its staff
and threatened the health and safety of its work force. Worker's Estate, Raytheon Argue First
California AIDS Handicap Case, AIDS POL'Y & L., Jan. 29, 1986, at 1. See also Tarr, Case Law
Scarce for Lawyers Involved in AIDS Suits, Nat'l LJ., Nov. 25, 1985, at 29, col. 1.
One employee is seeking $2 million in damages from her employer, the National Insti-
tute of Health, for requiring her to get "clearance" before bringing a friend, suspected of
having AIDS, into the institute building for lunch. Thompson, AIDS-Related Litigation Looms
Over Employers, INDUSTRY WEEK, Dec. 9, 1985, at 27.
The Enserch Corp. of Dallas, Texas recently placed two food service workers on disa-
bility leave with full salary and medical benefits after they tested positive on an AIDS blood
test. The natural gas holding company believed the action was in the "best interest of all
employees." Silas, AIDS On The Job, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1986, at 22.
For other examples of discrimination against employees with AIDS, see Leonard, Em-
ployment Discrimination Against Persons With AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 681, 688 n.32 (1985);
Parry, AIDS As a Handicapping Condition-Part I1, 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
2, 2 (1986); Comment, AIDS: A Legal Epidemic?, 17 AKRON L. REV. 717, 735 (1984).
8 This note defines an "AIDS victim" as a person who has tested positive on the AIDS
blood test and who has exhibited AIDS-related symptoms. See notes 25-45 infra and accom-
panying text.
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financial assistance cannot consider an employee's AIDS status
when making employment decisions.9
This note discusses whether courts should consider AIDS vic-
tims and those erroneously believed to be AIDS victims "handi-
capped individuals" under the federal Rehabilitation Act. Part I
gives a broad overview of AIDS, outlining current knowledge re-
garding the disease's symptomatology and communicability. Part II
examines the Rehabilitation Act, considering the regulatory imple-
mentation, legislative history, and case law interpretations of the
statute. Part III analyzes whether AIDS fits within the Rehabilita-
tion Act's definition of a handicap. Part IV concludes that, based
on the congressional intent behind the Rehabilitation Act and the
current case law definition of a "handicapped individual," courts
should consider AIDS a handicap entitled to the Act's protection.
I. AIDS: The Disease and Its Consequences
In June, 1981, the CDC reported an "unusual" outbreak of a
deadly form of pneumonia in five young homosexuals in the Los
Angeles area. 10 Less than a month later, the same agency disclosed
that ten more cases of the pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) had
been identified in homosexual men." At the same time, the CDC
also announced that a rare form of cancer, Kaposi's sarcoma (KS), was
appearing in the homosexual population with alarming fre-
quency. 12 The CDC characterized the occurrence of these two un-
9 Employers who violate the Rehabilitation Act face several possible penalties. Con-
tractors subject to § 503's provisions may be refused further federal contracts or have their
current contracts terminated. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.28 to .30 (1985). Most courts be-
lieve that § 503 does not provide a private cause of action. See Hodges v. Atchison, Topeka
and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 728 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1984); but see Clarke v. Felec Servs., Inc., 489
F. Supp. 165 (D. Alaska 1980) (holding that an implied private right of action exists under
§ 503). The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs which pursues § 503 claims
against federal contractors regularly seeks both reinstatement and back pay for the victim of
employment discrimination. See Guy, supra note 2, at 193-95. Organizations subject to
§ 504's provisions may have their federal financial assistance suspended or terminated. See
45 C.F.R. § 80.8 (1985); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (only program
directly receiving federal financial assistance, not organization as a whole, may have assist-
ance terminated). See also Guy, supra note 2, at 203-04. Courts recognize a private cause of
action for reinstatement and back pay under § 504. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone,
465 U.S. 624 (1984).
All but four states have enacted handicap discrimination laws which affect a large
number of employers not receiving federal contracts or financial assistance. The state defi-
nitions of a handicapped person vary greatly; however, many are patterned after the Reha-
bilitation Act definition. See Leonard, supra note 7, at 690-93.
10 Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 250, 251 (June 5, 1981).
11 Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystis Pneumonia Among Homosexual Meu-New York City and




common diseases in patients who were not immunosuppressed due
to known underlying disease or therapy as "highly unusual."' 3
AIDS, though yet unrecognized as a distinct disease, had arrived on
the medical scene.
Presently, the disease has reached epidemic proportions. Al-
most 19,000 persons have contracted the deadly disease'4-14,831
in the last two years alone.' 5 Once afflicted, the patient's prognosis
for survival is grim-the two year mortality rate for the disease is
close to ninety percent. 16 Over seventy-five percent of all patients
diagnosed as having AIDS before January 1984 are known dead.' 7
Demographically, AIDS has continued to plague the gay com-
munity. Homosexual or bisexual men account for seventy-three
percent of all AIDS cases.' 8 The disease afflicts other "risk groups"
but to a much lesser degree. These risk groups include: intrave-
nous drug users (177),' 9 hemophiliacs (1%),20 heterosexuals
(l7),21 and recipients of blood or blood products (270).22 Most
13 Id. at 306.
14 As of March 31, 1986, a total of 18,883 cases have been reported to the CDC. AIDS
PROGRAM, CENTER FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: WEEKLY SUR-
VEILLANCE REPORT-UNITED STATES (March 31, 1986) [hereinafter cited as WEEKLY SUR-
VEILLANCE REPORT]. For a more complete history of the early development of AIDS, see
Comment, supra note 7, at 718-22. /
15 According to CDC figures, 5,424 cases were diagnosed in 1984, 8,388 were found in
1985, and 1,019 had been reported by the end of March in 1986. WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE
REPORT, supra note 14.
16 EPIDEMIC OF ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME (AIDS) AND KAPOSI'S SAR-
COMA VII (G. Giraldo & E. Beth ed. 1984).
17 WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 14.
An experimental drug may offer some encouragement for AIDS victims. Though not a
cure for the disease, azidothymidine (AZT) did produce some short-term improvement in
those AIDS patients receiving the drug. One doctor who treated the patients stated that
"[t]he most significant aspect of this study is that it shows that the immune system of an
AIDS patient can at least partially reconstitute itself if the patients are given a drug which
blocks the replication of the virus." Drug Found to Give Patients With AIDS Short-Term Help,
N.Y. Times, March 14, 1986, at 9, col. 1.
18 WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 14.
19 Id.
20 Id. According to a recent CDC report "[t]he pattern of hemophilia-associated AIDS
appears to be changing in that the number of cases may be stabilizing or declining .. "
Changing Patterns of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in Hemophilia Patients-United States, 34
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 241 (Map 3,
1985).
21 WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 14.
22 Id. Although the CDC could include hemophiliacs within this risk group, the CDC
has chosen to list victims of this'blood disease separately. Id.
The CDC recognized early on that employers might use these demographic statistics as
a vehicle for discrimination against "high risk" groups. In late 1983, the agency observed:
[T]he classification of certain groups as being more closely associated with the
disease has been misconstrued by some to mean these groups are likely to transmit
the disease through non-intimate interactions. This view is not justified by avail-
able data. Nonetheless, it has been used unfairly as a basis for social and economic
discrimination.
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AIDS victims are white23 and between the ages of twenty and forty-
nine.
24
When dealing with employment discrimination against AIDS
victims, two traits of the disease must be examined carefully: symp-
tomatology and communicability. The disease's effect upon an em-
ployee's body and its potential transmission to other workers
impacts directly on whether discriminatory employment practices
can be justified.
A. Symptomatology
According to the CDC, AIDS is defined as "a disease, at least
moderately predictive of a defect in cell-mediated immunity, occur-
ring in a person with no known cause for diminished resistance to
that disease." 25 AIDS manifests itself in three forms: KS, PCP, and
serious "opportunistic infections." The symptoms of an AIDS pa-
tient correspond to the specific illness contracted and to the
changes that occur in the immune system when the AIDS victim
acquires the disease.
Most AIDS victims contract the parasitic infection, PCP.26
Symptoms such as weight loss, fever, diarrhea, and lymph node en-
largement develop gradually over a few months. 27 Once the telltale
symptom, shortness of breath, appears, the disease is usually quite
Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 32 CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 466 (Sept. 9, 1983).
23 The current race/ethnicity distribution of AIDS victims breaks down as follows:
White, not Hispanic-60%; Black, not Hispanic-25%o; Hispanic-14%; Other or Un-
known-2%. WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 14.
24 Eighty-nine percent of all AIDS patients fall within the 20-49 age bracket. Id. Ten
percent are older than forty-nine; a mere one percent are younger than 20. Id.
25 Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 31 CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 507, 508 (Sept. 24, 1982).
Though this definition was "[o]riginally intended as a guide to reporting cases to public
health officers and identifying groups at risk, the CDC working definition appears, in retro-
spect, to have been an excellent delineation of the fullblown syndrome." F. SIEGAL & M.
SIEGAL, AIDS: THE MEDICAL MYSTERY 15 (1983). Recently, the CDC slightly revised its
definition of AIDS. The CDC designed the revised definition to include only the "more
severe manifestations" of infection with the virus that causes AIDS. Only a "small" number
of additional cases will be reportable as a result of the revision. See Revision of the Case
Definition ofAcquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome for National Reporting-United States, 34 CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 373 (June 28, 1985).
Some observers believe that a considerable number of persons, having various forms
of the disease, are not registered in CDC surveys. See Leonard, supra note 7, at 681.
26 As of March 31, 1986, 58% of all AIDS victims were suffering from or had suffered
from PCP. WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 14.
27 See Cahill, Parasitic Infections, in THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 87 (1983); K. MAYER & H. PIZER,
THE AIDS FACT BOOK 53 (1983); F. SIEGAL & M. SIEGAL, supra note 25, at 22-23.
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advanced.28 Because it is rarely diagnosed at an early stage,29 PCP
frequently kills its victims.30
Eighteen percent of AIDS patients have fallen victim to KS, an
extremely rare form of cancer.3 ' Although its symptoms closely re-
semble those of PCP,32 KS is distinctly characterized by purplish
skin lesions. 33 If an AIDS victim contracts KS alone, it is not as
deadly as PCP;34 however, when a patient contracts both of these
diseases, the result is usually fatal. 35
If KS and PCP do not strike an AIDS victim, other "opportu-
nistic infections" (01) probably will.36 The expansive range of pos-
sible infections includes certain virulent forms of meningitis and
encephalitis. 37 Symptoms vary according to the particular disease
contracted. A composite list, however, would include the following
symptoms: fever, malaise, swollen glands, headaches, seizures, and
lethargy.38 01 frequently kills its victims; fifty-seven percent have
died from such infections since 1979.39
When a patient exhibiting the symptoms of AIDS is diagnosed
as having the disease, a frequent by-product of that diagnosis is dis-
crimination in the workplace. Fearing contagion and doubting
AIDS victims' ability to fulfill job requirements, employers and co-
workers frequently adopt a "hands off" attitude towards AIDS vic-
tims. 40 As one observer noted, "[t]here is a clear tension between
the rights of an individual infected with a fatal disease and the
rights of others to protect themselves from infection." 41 Thus,
when addressing employment discrimination, it is crucial to ask
how contagious is AIDS? What, in fact, are the chances of employ-
ees contracting the disease from a co-worker who has AIDS? And is
28 K. MAYER & H. PIZER, supra note 27, at 53.
29 See K. CAHILL, supra note 27, at 87.
30 Of the 10,911 AIDS victims who have acquired PCP since 1979, 5,909 (54%) have
died. WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 14.
31 WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 14.
32 Follow-Up on Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystis Pneumonia, 30 CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 409 (Aug. 28, 1981).
33 K. MAYER & H. PIZER, supra note 27, at 50.
34 KS has killed 41% of those AIDS victims who have contracted this disease alone.
WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 14.
35 In 6% of the reported AIDS cases, the victim has acquired both KS and PCP. For
such patients, the mortality rate is 66%. Id.
36 01 cases have comprised 19% of all AIDS cases to date. Id.
37 Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)--United States, 31 CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 507, 508 (Sept. 24, 1982).
38 K. MAYER & H. PIZER, supra note 27, at 54-57.
39 WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 14.
40 See note 7 supra.
41 Legal Issues Emerge in AIDS Epidemic: An Interview with NHLA Director, Henry P. Kaplan,
MD, JD, THE NATIONAL HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N (NHLA) REGISTER, Winter 1985, at 1.
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the public at large at risk when it deals with an AIDS-infected
employee?
B. Communicability
Researchers have identified a retrovirus called human T-lym-
photropic virus type III/lymphadenopathy-associated virus (HTLV-
III/LAV) as the causative agent of AIDS. 42 Exposure to the HTLV-
III/LAV virus does not guarantee the onset of AIDS.43 In cases in
which exposure does produce immune dysfunction in its host, it
may be several years before a fully developed case of AIDS is diag-
nosed.44 Because researchers have developed a test which detects
the presence of antibodies to HTLV-III/LAV in the bloodstream, 45
an employee may be diagnosed as "having AIDS" several years
before the most debilitating effects of the disease are first exper-
ienced. Upon learning of such a diagnosis, employers may discrim-
inate against AIDS victims several years before the disease makes
employment impractical.
On a medical level, concerns that an "AIDS-infected" em-
ployee will spread the disorder to other employees or to customers
appear unfounded. According to the CDC, the HTLV-III/LAV vi-
42 Antibodies to a Retrovirus Etiologically Associated with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) in Populations with Increased Incidences of the Syndrome, 33 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 377 (July 13, 1984). The CDC has defini-
tively stated that "human T-cell lymphotropic virus type III/lymphadenopathy-associated
virus (HTLV-III/LAV) has been recognized as the cause of AIDS." Revision of the Case Defini-
tion of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome for National Reporting-United States, supra note 25, at
373. See also Leonard, supra note 7, at 684 n.12; Comment, supra note 7, at 724 n.87.
43 Experts are uncertain as to how many of those persons exposed to the HTLV-
III/LAV virus will actually develop AIDS. Estimates range between 9% and 20%. Tarr,
AIDS: The Legal Issues Widen, Nat'l. L.J., Nov. 25, 1985, at 28, col. 1. A recent study by the
National Cancer Institute indicates that as many as 30% of those exposed to the HTLV-
III/LAV virus will contract AIDS. PWA's Should Map Extent of Care, Study Says, AIDS POL'Y &
L., Feb. 26, 1986, at 8.
44 "[S]everal years usually separate acquisition of infection with HTLV-III/LAV and
[the] onset of AIDS... ." Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 34 CEN-
TERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 245, 248 (May 10,
1985). "Currently reported AIDS cases have resulted from HTLV-III/LAV exposure up to
7 years before diagnosis; the possibility of longer incubation periods cannot be excluded."
Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 35 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL:
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 17, 20 (Jan. 17, 1986).
45 Tarr, supra note 43, at 28, col. 1. Controversy has erupted over whether employers
ought to routinely administer the HTLV-III/LAV blood tests to employees and job appli-
cants. One observer fears that the tests "will become the principal instrument of discrimi-
nation over the next few years." Id. Federal health officials have refused to endorse routine
blood screening of employees and job applicants. Summary: Recommendations for Preventing
Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Tpe IlI/Lymphadenopathy-Associated
Virus in the Workplace, 34 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 681 (Nov. 15, 1985). Federal health officials, however, have recommended
that all persons in AIDS high risk groups undergo periodic blood testing to determine if
they have become infected with the HTLV-III/LAV virus. Altman, U.S. Urges Blood Test for
Millions With High Risk of AIDS Infection, N.Y. Times, March 14, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
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rus is transmitted between adults only through sexual contact or
parenteral exposure to infected blood.46 These activities are not
associated with the workplace. As the GDC has stated, "[t]he kind
of nonsexual person-to-person contact that generally occurs among
workers and clients or consumers in the workplace does not pose a
risk for transmission of HTLV-III/LAV." 47 Present medical knowl-
edge suggests that AIDS is not spread by casual contact.
Considering the high mortality rate of AIDS victims due to the
disease's present incurability, it is not surprising that anxieties re-
main as to how the disease is spread. One observer recently noted
that:
While it is unlikely that AIDS can be contracted from personal
interactions other than the types identified so far, no one can
say categorically that other types of transmissions are impossi-
ble. Those experts who have attempted to give the public the
impression that the medical profession is certain how AIDS is
transmitted and that no one outside the high-risk groups should
worry may have gone too far in attempting to quell the public's
fears. 48
Even with assurances from the medical authorities that AIDS is not
spread by the casual contact found in the workplace, many employ-
ers continue to be wary of AIDS victims. When employers receive a
"100 percent guarantee" 49 that AIDS cannot be transmitted at the
workplace, employment discrimination against AIDS victims may
subside slightly. Until then, however, the mystery surrounding the
46 Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus
Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL:
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 682 (Nov. 15, 1985).
47 Id.
48 Parry, AIDS As a Handicapping Condition, 9 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
402, 403 (1985). Despite CDC findings, some experts remain skeptical of the assertion that
AIDS cannot be transmitted by casual contact. Prof. William Haseltine of the Harvard
Medical School recently warned a university audience, "[alnyone who tells you categorically
that AIDS is not contracted by saliva is not telling you the truth. . . . There are sure to be
cases of proved transmission through casual contact." Dershowitz, Emphasize Scientific Infor-
mation, N.Y. Times, March 18, 1986, at A27, col. 2. Prof. June Osborn of the University of
Michigan has cautioned, "we cannot be certain that increased transmissibility or increments
in virulence [of the AIDS virus] will not occur." Osborn, The AIDS Epidemic: An Overview of
the Science, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Winter 1986, at 55.
Recent tests also indicate that the AIDS virus can remain active up to 15 days outside
the body. Researchers caution, however, that the findings do not mean the virus can be
spread casually because unbroken skin appears to be an effective barrier against infection.
Tests Show AIDS Virus Can Live Up to 15 Days Outside the Body, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1986, at
AI5, col. 5.
49 In Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget and Management Policy, FCHR
No. 85-0624 (Dec. 11, 1985), reprinted in Daily Lab. R. No. 242, at E-1 (Dec. 17, 1985), the
employer defended its dismissal of an AIDS victim on the ground that it could not get a
"100 percent guarantee" that AIDS was not transmissible in the workplace. See Leonard,
supra note 7, at 697 n.66. The commission hearing the case refused to accept such a de-
fense. See notes 117-21 infra and accompanying text.
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possible transmission of the disease will continue as a major factor
in such employment discrimination cases.
To alleviate some of the aforementioned employer fears, the
CDC recently issued guidelines on how to prevent the transmission
of AIDS in the workplace.5 0 The recommendations, based upon a
"worst case" scenario,5 1 address four separate classes of workers:
health-care workers, 52 personal-service workers,5 3 food-service
workers,5 4 and other workers sharing the same work environ-
ment.55 In general, precautions are necessary only if one's job en-
tails possible exposure to AIDS-contaminated blood. 56 Unless one
is a health-care worker involved in invasive procedures such as in-
oculating patients, the risk of transmission of the disease in the
workplace is "extremely low." 57 Personal- and food-service work-
ers "known to be infected with HTLV-III/LAV need not be re-
stricted from work" unless they are otherwise ill.58 As to workers in
other settings, the CDC has stated:
[There is no] known risk of transmission to co-workers, clients,
or consumers [which] exists from HTLV-III/LAV-infected work-
ers . . . .Workers known to be infected with HTLV-III/LAV
should not be restricted from work solely based on this finding.
50 See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with HTLV-IIl/LAV in the
Workplace, supra note 46.
51 The CDC has found that the epidemiology of the HTLV-III/LAV virus is similar to
that of the virus which causes hepatitis B. Despite these similarities, the hepatitis B virus is
spread far more easily. Because the recommendations for preventing the spread of the
HTLV-III/LAV virus in the workplace are derived from the CDC's guidelines for control-
ling the transmission of hepatitis B, the recommendations concerning AIDS transmission
contemplate a "worst case" scenario. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection
with HTLV-III/LAV in the Workplace, supra note 46, at 683.
52 Health-care workers are defined to include "nurses, physicians, dentists and other
dental workers, optometrists, podiatrists, chiropractors, laboratory and blood bank technol-
ogists and technicians, phlebotomists, dialysis personnel, paramedics, emergency medical
technicians, medical examiners, morticians, housekeepers, laundry workers, and others
whose work involves contact with patients, their blood or other body fluids, or corpses." Id.
53 Personal-service workers are defined as "individuals whose occupations involve close
personal contact with clients (e.g., hairdressers, barbers, estheticians, cosmetologists, mani-
curists, pedicurists, massage therapists)." Id. at 693.
54 Food-service workers, according to the recommendations, are "individuals whose
occupations involve the preparation or serving of food or beverages (e.g., cooks, caterers,
servers, waiters, bartenders, airline attendants)." Id.
55 The "other workers" category would include any workers sharing work settings such
as "offices, schools, factories, [or] construction sites." Id. at 694.
56 Even though it is theoretically possible to contract AIDS from other body fluids of an
AIDS victim, "epidemiologic evidence has implicated only blood and semen in transmis-
sion." Id. at 682. The prosecutor's office of Genesee County, Mich. obviously did not be-
lieve this when, on December 8, 1985, it charged an AIDS victim, who had allegedly spit at
four police officers, with assault with intent to murder. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1985, (na-
tional edition) at 17.
57 Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with HTL V-Ill/LAV in the Work-
place, supra note 46, at 693.
58 Id.
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Moreover, they should not be restricted from using telephones,
office equipment, toilets, showers, eating facilities, and water
fountains. 59
Although doubts persist, available medical knowledge suggests
that the risk of AIDS transmission in the workplace is de minimis.
This fact alone, however, will not eliminate employment discrimi-
nation against AIDS victims. Employers may discriminate for a va-
riety of other reasons. Employers may believe retaining or hiring
AIDS victims will hurt business because of the public's fear of the
disease. Employees with AIDS may greatly increase an employer's
health coverage costs. 60 Concerns about employee absenteeism
and inability to perform job requirements may precipitate discrimi-
nation. Employers may harbor animosity towards homosexuals, the
group most likely to contract the disease. Citing the disease's se-
vere disabling effects and high mortality rate, employers may feel it
is a waste of time, money, and effort to train AIDS victims for cer-
tain jobs.6 1 All of these employer concerns, whether justified or
not, may cause AIDS victims considerable difficulty in securing and
maintaining employment. Consequently, AIDS victims who suffer
employment discrimination will turn to the legal system for protec-
tion. One potential source of protection for these individuals is the
Rehabilitation Act.
II. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Whom Does It Protect?
One year after enacting the Rehabilitation Act and seven years
before the first reports of AIDS started to trickle into the CDC,
Congress redefined who was a "handicapped individual" protected
under the Rehabilitation Act.62 That new definition defines a
"handicapped individual" as "any person who (i) has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
59 Id. at 694.
60 A national magazine for health care executives reported that, according to the CDC,
the national cost per day for an AIDS patient is $830, double the average daily cost for
other patients. Burda & Powills, AIDS: A Time Bomb at Hospitals' Door, HosPiTALs, Jan. 5,
1986, at 54. The most recent cost estimates for treating one AIDS patient range between
$60,000 to $140,000. Tarr, supra note 43, at 28, col. 3.
61 For a detailed treatment of potential employer defenses in employment discrimina-
tion cases involving AIDS victims, see Leonard, supra note 7, at 696-702.
62 A "handicapped individual" was originally defined as:
any individual who (A) has a physical or mental disability which for such individual
constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment and (B) can reason-
ably be expected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation
services provided pursuant to [Titles I and III] of this Act."
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(7)(B) (1982)). Congress decided that such a narrow definition was inconsistent with
its intent in passing the Rehabilitation Act because of "its orientation toward employment
and its relation to vocational rehabilitation services." S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 37, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6373, 6388.
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person's major life activities; (ii) has a record of such an impair-
ment; or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 63 The
operative terms in this statute such as "impairment," "substantially
limits," and "major life activities" are not defined in the Act.
Therefore, the regulations promulgated by the federal agencies
charged with implementing the Rehabilitation Act must be ex-
amined to understand who is a "handicapped individual" under
federal law.
A. Regulations Promulgated Under the Act
Two federal agencies are primarily responsible for further de-
fining the term "handicapped individual." 64 The Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS)6 5 implements section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act; its regulations govern the actions of employers
receiving federal financial assistance.66 The Department of Labor's
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) imple-
ments section 503 of the Act; its regulations provide guidance for
federal contractors in determining which employees or job appli-
cants qualify as handicapped. 67 Although the regulations issued by
the two agencies differ in certain minor respects, 68 they should be
read together when interpreting section 706(7)(B)'s definition of a
"handicapped individual." 69  Certain aspects of the regulations
bear directly upon a determination of whether AIDS is a protected
63 Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111 (a), 88 Stat. 1619 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)
(1982)).
64 In 1974, when Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act, it stated:
Executive Order No. 11758, section 2, delegates to the Secretary of Labor the
responsibility for carrying out the responsibilities embodied in section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and a similar delegation of responsibility to the Secre-
tary of [Health and Human Services] is urged to carry out on a Government-wide
basis those responsibilities embodied in section 504.
S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
6373, 6391.
65 When Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act, the now Department of Health and
Human Services was called the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
66 Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977), authorizes the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (currently the Department of Health and Human
Services) to coordinate implementation of § 504 by all federal departments and agencies
which extend federal financial assistance. For a more specific examination of the statutory
authority for such regulations, see Guy, supra note 2, at 197-99.
67 Exec. Order No. 11,758, 3a C.F.R. 116 (1974), empowers the Secretary of the De-
partment of Labor to issue regulations effecting § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act.
68 See notes 76-80 infra and accompanying text.
69 Such was the clear design of Congress when, upon enacting the new definition, it
stated that:
It is intended that sections 503 and 504 be administered in such a manner that
a consistent, uniform, and effective Federal approach to discrimination against
handicapped persons would result. Thus, Federal agencies and departments
should cooperate in developing standards and policies so that there is a uniform,




According to the HHS regulations, a "physical impairment"
for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act is "any physiological disor-
der or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affect-
ing one or more of the following body systems: neurological;
musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech
organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary;
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine."' 71 Although the im-
mune system is notably absent from the list, AIDS still appears to
qualify as a "physical impairment." AIDS, a disease of many guises,
could be seen as a "physiological disorder" which "affects" the
"hemic and lymphatic" systems. These two systems, integral parts
of the complex immune system, exhibit the most telling symptoms
of AIDS 72 and, thus, are "affected" by the disorder.
The federal agencies do not believe the definition of physical
impairment should be construed narrowly. When adopting the
present definition, the HHS expressly refused to "set forth a list of
specific diseases and conditions that constitute physical... impair-
ments because of the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness
of any such list." 73 Thus, it appears of limited consequence that
AIDS does not fall mechanically within the definition's contours. In
producing immune dysfunction, AIDS subjects all body systems to
attack and, therefore, should properly be considered a "physical
impairment."
It also seems immaterial that the disorder did not exist when
Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act. When the HHS shortened
its definition of "physical impairment," it deleted a clause "which
made explicit the inclusion of any condition which is .. .physical
S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs
6373, 6391.
70 A full discussion of the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act is
beyond the scope of this note. This note discusses only those aspects of the regulations
which bear directly upon a determination of whether an AIDS victim is within the definition
of "handicapped individual."
71 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1985).
72 See notes 25-39 supra and accompanying text.
73 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A (1985). The HHS regulations do proceed to give an incom-
plete list of diseases and conditions which are explicitly included in the term "physical im-
pairment." The regulations provide that:
The term includes, however, such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual,
speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy,
multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional
illness and .... drug addiction and alcoholism.
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but whose precise nature is not at present known." 74 According to
the HHS, such a clause was unnecessary because the definition as
adopted "clearly comprehend[s] such conditions." 75 Such lan-
guage suggests that AIDS is a "physical impairment" for purposes
of the Rehabilitation Act.
2. "Substantially Limits"
The statutory definition of a "handicapped individual" re-
quires that a physical impairment "substantially limit" the individ-
ual's major life activities. 76 Although the "substantially limiting"
restriction appears crucial in determining who is handicapped,
neither the HHS nor the OFCCP regulations provide much gui-
dance to the phrase's proper interpretation. 77 The HHS side-
stepped the entire issue when it promulgated its regulations by
declaring that "[t]he Department does not believe that a definition
of this term is possible at this time."7
8
The OFCCP provided minimal assistance when it defined the
phrase to mean "the degree that the impairment affects em-
ployability. A handicapped individual who is likely to experience
difficulty in securing, retaining or advancing in employment would
be considered substantially limited." 79 Such a definition is quite lib-
eral; indeed, one writer has stated that this construction "conceiva-
bly could apply to anyone who is denied a job."80 The OFCCP
definition makes meeting the "substantially limiting" restriction al-
most a foregone conclusion because ajob applicant or an employee
seeks the Rehabilitation Act's protection precisely because he has
experienced difficulty at the workplace. His physical impairment,
therefore, affects his employability and "substantially limits" his
activities81
Whether or not the "substantially limiting" restriction refers to
employability, as the OFCCP suggests, or to life activities in gen-
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
77 As one observer noted, "[t]he most significant restriction on the statutory definition
of handicapped is the phrase 'substantially limits'; the precise meaning of this phrase re-
mains unclear." Comment, Employment Rights of Handicapped Individuals: Statutory and Judicial
Parameters, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 291, 294 (1978).
78 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A (1985).
79 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1985).
80 See Guy, supra note 2, at 229. One commentator suggested that the word "substan-
tial" should not be read to mean "considerable in extent" but rather to mean "actual" or
"real." "The focus should be on whether the disability is 'actual' or 'real,' not on whether it
is extensive." Comment, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Who Is Handicapped Under Federal Law,
16 U.S.F.L. REV. 653, 674-77 (1982).
81 For one federal court's interpretation of the term "substantially limits," see notes
99-102 infra and accompanying text.
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eral, as the plain reading of the statute suggests, AIDS can qualify
as a "substantially limiting" impairment. Few impairments have as
profound an impact on one's personal autonomy as does AIDS.
When AIDS renders the body incapable of combatting disease,
many, if not most, aspects of the victim's life are drastically altered.
Due to the physically disabling effects of the disease and to the pub-
lic stigma attached to contracting the disease, the victim's ability to
function in society and at the workplace may be greatly hindered,
i.e. "substantially limited."
3. "Major Life Activities"
This term, as used in the statutory definition of "handicapped
individual," appears self-explanatory. The federal agencies have
construed the term broadly. The HHS regulations provide the nar-
rower of the two agency interpretations, citing the following func-
tions as "major life activities": "caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learn-
ing, and working." 82 To this list, the OFCCP regulations add "so-
cialization,. . . vocational training .... adapting to housing, etc." 83
From their context, it can be inferred that these lists were not
meant to be exhaustive or exclusive.84
AIDS appears to substantially limit its victim's "major life activ-
ities." The extensive medical treatment an AIDS victim typically
requires over the course of his disease85 shows that he will fre-
quently be unable to care for himself. As the disease progresses, an
AIDS victim's capacity to work will invariably diminish. If the AIDS
victim contracts a disease such as PCP which attacks the respiratory
system, breathing will be inhibited. The mere diagnosis of AIDS
will, in most instances, profoundly affect the victim's social interac-
tions with other people. And though the agencies do not list it spe-
82 45 G.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1985).
83 The complete definition provided by the OFGGP reads: " 'Life activities' may be con-
sidered to include communication, ambulation, selfcare, socialization, education, vocational
training, employment, transportation, adapting to housing, etc. For the purpose of section
503 of the Act, primary attention is given to those life activities that affect employability."
41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1985). One commentator has criticized this definition:
While the extent to which one's major life activities are limited or are perceived to
be limited may be manifested in a decreased access to playmates, an education, or
a job, these deprivations are the effect, rather than the-cause, of one's status as a
"handicapped individual" as Congress has defined the term. Under OFCGP's con-
trary interpretation, the definition is a tautological curiosity that is no help whatso-
ever to employers, agencies, or the courts.
Guy, supra note 2, at 231 (emphasis in original).
84 For example, the inclusion of the abbreviation "etc." at the end of the OFCCP list of
"life activities" shows that the OFCGP did not intend to limit the term's definition to those
functions specifically mentioned.
85 The high medical costs associated with treating an AIDS patient show the substantial
degree of medical care that an AIDS victim requires. See note 60 supra.
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cifically, the maintenance of one's good health can logically be seen
as a "major life activity." The limiting of any of these activities
86
renders AIDS an impairment which affects "major life activities."
In summary, agency guidelines suggest that AIDS qualifies as a
"physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more [of its victim's] major life activities."8 7 Accordingly, employ-
ees or job applicants with AIDS would appear to be "handicapped
individuals" protected by the Rehabilitation Act.
Declaring AIDS a handicap would mean that persons perceived
as having AIDS, as well as actual victims of AIDS, could find legal
refuge in the Rehabilitation Act. Persons perceived as having AIDS
would include individuals who exhibit AIDS-associated symptoms,
individuals who test positive on the AIDS blood test,8 8 and friends
of actual AIDS victims. These individuals would find protection
under section 706(7)(B)'s definition of a "handicapped individual"
which includes any person who is "regarded as having ... an im-
pairment. '"89 Thus, any employee or job applicant who was dis-
criminated against because he was suspected of having AIDS would
qualify for protection, whether or not he in fact had the disorder.9
86 Note that the statutory definition of a "handicapped individual" requires that the
impairment affect "one or more" major life activities. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). Conse-
quently, even if AIDS affects only one of the "major life activities" discussed in the text, the
disease clears this definitional hurdle.
87 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
88 One example of the potential employment discrimination faced by persons who test
positive on the AIDS blood test recently occurred in Abilene, Texas. The Hendrick Medi-
cal Center discharged an assistant cafeteria worker after his donated blood was found to
contain antibodies to the HTLV-III/LAV virus. The hospital believed the worker's dismis-
sal was necessary because of "the disruption to the work environment caused by [the em-
ployee's] inappropriate communication to other employees about his medical condition."
The employee has filed a charge of discrimination under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
AIDS-As-Disability Debate Fueled By Bias Case, AIDS POL'Y & L., Feb. 26, 1986, at 3.
89 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
90 Regarding this clause of § 706(7)(B), Congress stated that:
Clause (C) in the new definition clarifies the intention to include those persons
who are discriminated against on the basis of handicap, whether or not they are in
fact handicapped, just as title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimi-
nation on the ground of race, whether or not the person discriminated against is in
fact a member of a racial minority. This subsection includes within the protection
of sections 503 and 504 those persons who do not in fact have the condition which
they are perceived as having, as well as those persons whose mental or physical
condition does not substantially limit their life activities and who thus are not tech-
nically within clause (A) in the new definition. Members of both of these groups
may be subjected to discrimination on the basis of their being regarded as
handicapped.
S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEws 6373,
6389-90. The HHS regulations note that the "is regarded" clause "includes many persons
who are ordinarily considered to be handicapped but who do not technically fall within the
first two parts of the statutory definition." 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A (1985). See also 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (1985); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1985).
An employee who is regarded as having AIDS but who in fact does not have the disease
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In adopting such a definition, Congress wisely recognized that
the sanctions imposed by the Rehabilitation Act should depend
upon the existence of a discriminatory motive in an employer's
mind, and not upon the presence of a handicap in an employee's
body. One district court expressed this sentiment rather well:
[Congress'] intent was to protect people who are denied em-
ployment because of an employer's perceptions, whether or not
those perceptions are accurate. It is of little solace to a person
denied employment to know that the employer's view of his or
her condition is erroneous. To such a person the perception of
the employer is as important as reality.9'
Before reaching a definitive conclusion on whether AIDS is a
Rehabilitation Act handicap, one must examine how the federal
courts have interpreted the statutory definition of "handicapped in-
dividual." If the courts have narrowly construed this definition,
AIDS might not be deemed a handicap regardless of what HHS or
OFCCP regulations might suggest.
B. Federal Judicial Interpretations of the "Handicapped Individual"
Very few federal courts have analyzed section 706(7)(B)'s defi-
nition of a "handicapped individual" in any significant detail. 92
Most actions brought under the Rehabilitation Act involve physical
or mental disabilities which either are presumed to be handicaps or
are easily proven to be handicaps within the prescribed statutory
definition. 93 Two federal decisions which do closely examine the
should find it much easier to prove' that he is "otherwise qualified" to perform the job in
question. See note 4 supra.
91 E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (D. Hawaii 1980).
92 As one court stated: "Very few cases spend much time on the issue, as the issue
usually requires little analysis." Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 744 (C.D.
Cal. 1984).
93 See, e.g., Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (epilepsy); Norcross v.
Sneed, 755 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1985) (congenital visual impairment); Bentivegna v. United
States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982) (diabetes); Doe v. New York Univ., 666
F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981) (severe mental illness); Simon v. St. Louis County, Mo., 656 F.2d
316 (8th Cir. 1981) (paraplegia); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985) (heart
attack, nervous breakdown, hernia); Bento v. I.T.O. Corp. of R.I., 599 F. Supp. 731 (D.R.I.
1984) (heart bypass surgery); Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp.
1130 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (nocturnal epilepsy, dyslexia, cerebral palsy); Klein v. Albro, No. 81-
CV-1288 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1982) (muscular dystrophy) (available on LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, Dist file); Longoria v. Harris, 554 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (amputee); Bey v.
Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (record of physical impairment, cardiac disease);
Doe v. Syracuse School Dist., 508 F. Supp. 333 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (history of prior nervous
breakdown); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (epi-
lepsy).
Courts have found some unusual "handicaps." See, e.g., Fynes v. Weinberger, C.A. No.
85-0427 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 1985) (asbestosis declared a handicap) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 32 Fair Emp. Prac. Cases
(BNA) 1217 (W.D. Wash 1983) (Vietnam veteran suffering from post-traumatic stress dis-
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Rehabilitation Act's definition of a "handicapped individual" sup-
port the argument that AIDS is a protected handicap.
In E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall,94 a federal court interpreted sec-
tion 706(7)(B) for the first time.95 The court, rejecting a claim that
section 706(7)(B)'s definition of a "handicapped individual" was
unconstitutionally vague, concluded that "Congress wanted the
statute to have broad coverage and effect." 96 After examining the
relevant regulations and legislative history,97 the court affirmed
prior administrative opinions in the case and held that the term
"impairment" meant "any condition which weakens, diminishes, re-
stricts, or otherwise damages an individual's health or physical or
mental activity." 98 Considering the devastating impact that the dis-
ease has upon its victim's health, AIDS comes within the Black
court's definition of "impairment."
The Black court also made an in-depth analysis of the term
"substantially limits" and, again, construed the term broadly. Rea-
soning that "the real focus must be on the individual job seeker,
and not solely on the impairment," 99 the court held that each ques-
tion of substantiality must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 00
The court stated that "[i]f an individual were disqualified from the
same or similar jobs offered by employers throughout the area to
which he had reasonable access,"'' his impairment would be "sub-
stantially limiting," at least in terms of employment. 10 2 Under this
interpretation of the term, it can be assumed that, partly because of
the pervasive public paranoia about AIDS, the disorder would qual-
ify as "substantially limiting." An AIDS victim might experience
discrimination from many employers over a widespread area. Even
order deemed a "handicapped individual"); Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85
(W.D. Wash. 1982) (unusual sensitivity to tobacco smoke limited employee's "major life
activity" because of incapacity to work in anything but a completely smoke-free environ-
ment); Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 31 Fair Emp. Prac. Cases (BNA) 459 (D. Colo.
1982) (employee's back injuries determined to be handicap).
94 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980). For a more probing analysis of this decision,
see Haines, E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall: A Penetrating Interpretation of "Handicapped Individ-
ual"for Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and for Various State Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Statutes, 16 Lov. L.A.L. REV. 527 (1983); Comment, supra note 80.
95 "This case of first impression involves the construction and interpretation of several
sections of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... and appurtenant regulations." 497 F. Supp.
at 1090.
96 Id. at 1098.
97 See notes 62-84 supra and accompanying text.
98 497 F. Supp. at 1098.
99 Id. at 1100.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1101.
102 The court cautioned that "what is to be considered a similar job must be made on a
case-by-case basis, and may differ among individuals with similar impairments, depending
on their training, education, etc." Id.
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if he does find an employer educated as to how AIDS is spread,
employer concerns regarding employee relations and potential
health insurance costs may influence employment decisions. Thus,
according to the Black court's definitions of "impairment" and
"substantially limits," AIDS would appear to be a handicap.
The risk of contagion might be viewed as a major obstacle in
any attempt to have AIDS classified as a protected handicap.
Although the risk of transmission might differentiate AIDS from so-
called "traditional" handicaps, this fact, according to one court,
does not necessarily remove the disease from the Rehabilitation
Act's protection.103 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit recently ruled that the contagious disease, tuber-
culosis, is a handicap for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. The
case, Arline v. School Board of Nassau County, 10 4 involved an elemen-
tary school teacher who was discharged from herjob because of her
susceptibility to tuberculosis. 0 5 The district court had found that a
contagious disease such as tuberculosis was not a "handicap"
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.' 06
After examining the pertinent HHS regulations, the Eleventh
Circuit disapproved of such a finding. The court stated that:
Though the district court apparently thought it illogical to con-
clude that Congress would have placed contagious diseases
within the definition of "handicaps," there is no objective evi-
dence to support this conclusion. Neither the regulations nor
the statutory language giye any indication that chronic con-
tagious diseases are to be excluded from the definition of
"handicap."1 07
The court refused to carve out an exception to the statutory defini-
tion of a "handicapped individual" "where there [was] not a scin-
103 The HHS (then, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare), upon promul-
gation of its regulations regarding § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, recognized that the Act
did not solely protect those individuals with "traditional" handicaps. The regulations pro-
vide that:
A related issue.., is whether the definition of handicapped person is unrea-
sonably broad. Comments suggested narrowing the definition in various ways.
The most common recommendation was that only "traditional" handicaps be cov-
ered. The Department continues to believe, however, that it has no flexibility
within the statutory definition to limit the term to persons who have those severe,
permanent, or progressive conditions that are most commonly regarded as
handicaps.
45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A (1985).
104 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986).
105 Id. at 760.
106 The court of appeals noted that the district court supported its conclusion by stating,
"it's difficult for this court to conceive that Congress intended contagious diseases to be
included within the definition of a handicapped person .... Id. at 763.
107 Id. at 764.
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tilla of evidence that Congress had any intention of doing so." 10 8
Finding no valid reason to rule otherwise, the Eleventh Circuit held
that a contagious disease may qualify as a "handicap" under the
Rehabilitation Act.
109
Although the federal case law on this issue is limited, those
courts which have considered the issue have generally agreed with
the liberal interpretation of section 706(7) (B) espoused by the Black
and Arline courts.' 10 A few courts in recent years, concerned that
the term handicapped might become a meaningless phrase, Il have
refused to classify certain purported impairments, such as crossed
eyes, 1 2 an excessively muscular build, 1 3 and left-handedness, 14 as
"handicaps." 15 This type of concern is not present when address-
ing the devastating disease, AIDS. Considering both the flexibility
that federal courts have exhibited when defining "handicapped in-
108 Id. The court also supported its decision not to create an exception by observing
that "Congress' failure to exclude contagious diseases from coverage when it specifically
excluded alcoholism and drug abuse implies that it harbored no similar disapproval about
them." Id.
109 Although not specifically addressing whether a contagious disease could be classified
as a "handicap" for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, an important earlier case is New
York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1978),
aff'd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979). In this case, the federal district court examined a conta-
gious disease, hepatitis B, and concluded that restricting mentally retarded students in-
fected with the disease to certain classes violated the Rehabilitation Act. The court
reasoned that "[biased on the evidence we have heard, we find that the risk of contagion of
hepatitis B among mentally retarded children is not substantial enough to justify their dis-
criminatory exclusion from public school. The risk of contagion cannot be ignored, but
there are prophylactic measures, not necessarily as stringent as those of the Department of
Health, which can be taken to reduce the risks to a de minimis level." 466 F. Supp. at 486.
Judicial attitudes such as this towards a disease more contagious (see Recommendations for
Preventing Transmission of Infection with HTLV-Ill/LAV in the Workplace, supra note 46), albeit
less deadly than AIDS, bodes well for AIDS victims who must bring their employment dis-
crimination claims to federal court.
110 See Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1098 ("Congress was not required to spell out in detail
every possible condition or abnormality that could constitute an impairment. It is clear that
Congress was trying to protect a large number of people in a broad range of situations.").
See also Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d at 775 ("Our conclusion [that severe mental illness
constituted a "handicap"] is reinforced by the wide scope of the definition in [section
706(7)(B)] ... and by its legislative history, which indicates that the definition is not to be
construed in a niggardly fashion."); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. at 746 (court
made its decision "cognizant that the definitions are generally to be read broadly").
Ill See, e.g., Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746.
112 Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985) (criticizing Black
court's analysis of definitional elements of § 706(7)(B)).
113 Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
114 de Ia Torres v. Bolger, 610 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Tex. 1985), aft'd, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th
Cir. 1986).
115 See, e.g., Oesterling v. Walters, 760 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1985) (varicose veins in leg
deemed an "impairment" which, although affecting "major life activities" of sitting and
standing, did not "substantially limit" such activities); Pridemore v. Rural Legal Aid Soc'y
of West Cent. Ohio, 625 F. Supp. 1180 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (a "borderline" case of cerebral
palsy was deemed not to constitute a "handicap"); Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409,
1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (An undisclosed transitory illness held not a "handicap." "Whatever
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dividual" and the general disdain they hold for apparently unjusti-
fied employment discrimination, it seems likely that these courts
will extend the Rehabilitation Act's protection to victims of
AIDS.I16
Although no federal court has addressed this issue,1 17 one tri-
bunal, the Florida Commission on Human Relations, has consid-
ered whether it should classify AIDS as a legally recognized
handicap in the employment context. Shuttleworth v. Broward County
Office of Budget and Management Policy,118 involved a state clerical
worker who was fired from his job because he had contracted AIDS.
The Commission's opinion is noteworthy because it examined the
Florida statute which defines a handicapped individual as a person
having "a physical impairment which substantially limits one or
more major life activities or ... [a person who] is regarded as hav-
ing such physical impairment."' 1 9 Over employer contentions that
AIDS was not a handicap because it was a communicable disease,
the Commission ruled that AIDS is a physical impairment for pur-
poses of the Florida statute.120 Because the employer dismissed its
employee for having the handicap of AIDS, the Commission found
the precise delineations of the term 'impairment, the court is unconvinced that it encom-
passes transitory illnesses which have no permanent effect on the person's health.").
The legislative history of § 706(7)(B) provides some additional support for these deci-
sions. "[A] new definition has been developed which would provide sufficient latitude (but
still not be totally open ended) ... for the nondiscrimination programs carried out under sec-
tions... 503 and 504... ." S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 63, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6376, 6413 (emphasis added).
116 Most commentators believe AIDS is a handicap covered by the Rehabilitation Act.
See, e.g., Parry, supra note 7, at 2 ("[Tlhere can be little doubt that the federal [definition of a
handicap] include[s] AIDS."); Cecere, AIDS Presents Many Legal Issues for Workplace, LEGAL
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1985, at 10 ("Given the federal and state discrimination laws' definition of
handicap, it is necessary to conclude that AIDS is a handicap since AIDS is a medical im-
pairment of normal bodily functions.").
117 The New York State Attorney General, in a case dealing with discrimination in "pub-
lic accommodations," concluded that AIDS is a handicap covered under the New York
Human Rights Law. The case involved the refusal of an apartment board of directors to
renew a gay doctor's lease. The doctor, although not an AIDS victim himself, had treated
many AIDS patients at the Greenwich Village apartment complex. A trial judge, in denying
the apartment board's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, impliedly affirmed the
attorney general's earlier decision that AIDS was a handicap protected under state law.
The case was settled before the court reached a final determination in the case. People v.
49 West 12th St. Tenants' Corp., No. 43604/83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 17, 1983) (unpublished
opinion), discussed in N.Y.LJ., Oct. 17, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
118 FCHR No. 85-0624 (Dec. 11, 1985), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. No. 242, E-1, E-5
(Dec. 17, 1985).
119 This language of the Florida statute, FLA. STAT. § 760.22(5) (Supp. 1984), is obvi-
ously modeled after the corresponding provisions of the Rehabilitation Act. In reaching its
decision, the Commission also used the HHS regulatory definitions as guides in construing
the key terms, "physical impairment," "substantially limits," and "major life activities."
Shuttleworth, Daily Lab. Rep. No. 242, at E-5.
120 "[lIt is clearly evident that Complainant's lymphatic condition and cancer (Kaposi's
sarcoma) qualify as physical impairments as previously defined." Id. at E-6.
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in favor of the employee. 12 1
In a recent case involving an AIDS victim's right to attend pub-
lic school, a state court held that AIDS does qualify as a handicap
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In District 27 Community
School Board v. Board of Education,122 the Supreme Court of Queens
County, New York ruled that the New York City Board of Educa-
tion had properly allowed a student with AIDS to attend public
school. 123 In holding that exclusion of the AIDS-infected child
from school would violate section 504, the court determined that
AIDS does qualify as a "physical impairment" for purposes of the
Rehabilitation Act. 124 The court emphasized that, according to the
relevant regulations, a covered impairment included disorders or
conditions affecting the "hemic and lymphatic" body systems. 125
Because the AIDS virus destroys certain lymphocytes, integral ele-
ments of these systems, an AIDS victim "clearly has such a 'physical
impairment.' "126 Without analyzing whether this physical impair-
ment "substantially limits" its victim's "major life activities," the
court declared that AIDS is a Rehabilitation Act handicap.
1 27
Although the rulings of this state court and of the Florida Commis-
sion on Human Relations are not binding precedent, the District 27
Community School Board and Shuttleworth opinions demonstrate that
recognition of AIDS as a handicap is a plausible judicial stance.
Federal courts should not hesitate to rule accordingly.
III. Can the Rehabilitation Act Protect AIDS Victims?
Most of the indicia from the foregoing examination of AIDS
and the Rehabilitation Act support the conclusion that AIDS is a
"handicap" protected by the Act. The debilitating effects 128 and
disheartening incurability 29 of the disease show that AIDS, like
commonly recognized handicaps, is a serious, disabling handicap
for those who acquire it. Looking to the plain meaning of the stat-
ute, one might conclude that AIDS is a "physical impairment"'
30
which "substantially limits"' 3  its victim's "major life activities."'
3 2
121 Id.
122 No. 14940-85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 11, 1986).
123 Slip op. at 49.
124 Id. at 52.
125 Id. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
126 District 27 Community School Board, slip op. at 52. The court also observed that AIDS
victims would be covered under the "is regarded" clause of the Rehabilitation Act defini-
tion of a "handicapped individual." Id. See notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
127 District 27 Community School Board, slip op. at 53.
128 See notes 25-41 supra and accompanying text.
129 See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
130 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). See notes 71-75 supra and accompanying text.
131 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). See notes 76-81 supra and accompanying text.
132 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). See notes 82-86 supra and accompanying text.
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More exacting scrutiny of the relevant regulatory specifications for
a handicap13 3 lends even more probative force to the argument that
AIDS qualifies as a handicap. The Act's legislative history clearly
contemplates its broad application. 134 Thus, federal courts will
probably hold that the Rehabilitation Act protects AIDS victims be-
cause "coverage would so clearly serve to promote Congress' intent
to reduce instances of unthinking and unnecessary discrimination
against those who are the focus of the statute's concern." 13 5
Some critics of the assertion that AIDS is a handicap for
purposes of the Rehabilitation Act allege that there is a voluntary
aspect to acquiring the disease. Although only applicable to indi-
viduals who contract AIDS through sexual contact, 13 6 this argument
suggests that AIDS is not a handicap because it is an impairment
acquired by choice. Congress' specific exclusion of current drug
and alcohol abusers from the definition of a handicapped individ-
ual1 37 could be construed to show that Congress did not intend to
extend the Rehabilitation Act to protect those with "voluntary" im-
133 See notes 64-87 supra and accompanying text.
134 See notes 62 and 103 supra; cf. note 115 supra (definition broad, but not unlimited).
135 Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759, 764 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986).
136 Theoretically, this argument might also be advanced against AIDS victims who ac-
quire the disease through intravenous drug use. Such an argument is considerably weak-
ened, however, by the determination of the Secretary of the HHS that drug abusers are
protected under the Rehabilitation Act. See note 137 infra.
137 Section 706(7)(B), in addition to providing the definition of a "handicapped individ-
ual," contains the following provision:
For purposes of sections 793 and 794 of this title as such sections relate to employ-
ment, such term does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug
abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from per-
forming the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of such
current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the
safety of others.
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). The HHS regulations, however, in interpreting § 706(7)(B),
provide that drug addiction and alcoholism may qualify as handicaps. The regulations pro-
vide that:
The Secretary has carefully examined the issue [of whether to include drug addicts
and alcoholics within the definition of handicapped person] and has obtained a
legal opinion from the Attorney General. That opinion concludes that drug addic-
tion and alcoholism are "physical or mental impairments" within the meaning of
section 7(6) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, and that drug addicts
and alcoholic are therefore handicapped for purposes of section 504 if their im-
pairment substantially limits one of their major life activities. The Secretary there-
fore believes that he is without authority to exclude these conditions from the
definition.
45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A (1985). Most courts have agreed with the HHS interpretation and
have ruled that alcoholism or drug abuse does not automatically disqualify one from handi-
capped status. The alcoholic or drug user must usually show that he has recovered from his
substance abuse and that his impairment does not affect the current performance of his job.
See Tinch v. Walters, 765 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1985); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629
F.2d 1226, 1231 n.8 (7th Cir. 1980); Healy v. Bergman, 609 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Mass. 1985);
Traynor v. Walters, 606 F. Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Athanas v. Board of Educ. of School
1986] NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
pairments. As one writer opined, a "volitional victim, to a large
extent, does choose his or her problem."'13 An employer might
assert that homosexuals who acquire AIDS are not innocent victims
of a handicap, as are epileptics or paraplegics. The employer might
claim that their impairments are self-imposed and should not be
protected handicaps under the Rehabilitation Act.1 39
In rebuttal, one must question whether a so-called "decision"
to expose oneself to AIDS can be considered voluntary. One does
not rationally choose to confront a life-threatening disease; homo-
sexuals do not elect to become AIDS victims to obtain protection
under the Rehabilitation Act. One exposed to AIDS through sexual
contact does not choose to contract a handicap, just as one who
loses an arm while running farm machinery does not choose to ac-
quire his handicap. Both "accidents" are the unfortunate and unin-
tended consequences of common behavior. Construing the
development of AIDS to be a "voluntary" handicap stretches such a
concept past the breaking point.
IV. Conclusion
Persons with AIDS are frequently the victims of both a deadly,
misunderstood disease and cruel, unjustified discrimination. When
this discrimination invades workplaces benefiting from federal con-
tracts or financial assistance, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 should
provide a measure of legal protection for AIDS victims who have
been discriminated against. Congress clearly intended for this Act
to be a flexible and meaningful weapon to fight an employer's base-
less discrimination against the handicapped. The broad definition
of a protected "handicapped individual" that Congress enacted can
include persons with AIDS. Accordingly, because no viable statu-
tory or judicial barriers exist to such a classification, AIDS should
be deemed a "handicap" for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.
Gregory M. Shumaker
Dist. 111, 28 Fair Emp. Prac. Cases (BNA) 569 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F.
Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
138 Ogden, Justice and the Problem of the Volitional Victim, 1977 LABOR LJ. 417, 420.
139 The court in Tudyman, 608 F.2d 739, refused to deem the plaintiff's excessively mus-
cular build a handicap for purposes of § 504. One of the reasons the court gave for its
ruling was that the "[plaintiff's] weight and low fat content are self-imposed and voluntary.
This distinguishes the present case from one in which the plaintiff's weight was involun-
tary-e.g., the result of a glandular problem." Id. at 746.
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